India-US Partnership: A moment for optimism or caution?

India is an outlier in the American policy circle and has been for some time. During a time of uncertainty in US foreign policy under the Trump administration, what has remained constant is the American approach towards improving relations with India. The signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in the middle of the tumultuous US presidential election campaign signifies India’s importance to the US. BECA is the last of the four fundamental agreements considered to be the cornerstone of the India-US partnership in the 21st century. Interestingly, two out of these four fundamental agreements were signed during the Trump presidency.

The first of these agreements was agreed upon between the Vajpayee government and the Bush (Jr) administration in 2002 when the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSMIA) was signed. The Modi government signed the second of the fundamental agreements in the series known as The Logistics Exchanged Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, during the then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s visit to the US. The third agreement, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was signed in 2018 by the Modi government and the Trump administration. In the meantime, in 2005, both countries began implementing a ten-year Framework for Defence Co-operation as agreed upon between the Bush (Jr) administration and the Manmohan Singh government. This was the groundwork for the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. The Manmohan Singh government and the Obama administration also finalized and signed the End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) in 2009. The Framework for Defence Co-operation was extended for 10 more years in 2015 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the then US President Barack Obama. Both of them also announced the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. It is amply clear that irrespective of the ruling party and the leadership in both the countries over the past two decades, there is no dying down of the momentum towards strengthening the strategic ties between India and the US.

At the end of the cold war, the US attempted to draw in the successor of the USSR, Russia, into the western world order. Similarly, it was expected that China’s integration into world institutions would lead to a sustainable order wherein the US would continue to lead the world. Much to its dismay, the US realized that its optimism was largely misplaced. Neither Russia nor China has shown willingness to work under the US hegemony. However, the real setback to the US is with respect to the dominant position of Germany in the European Union, the ever-growing aspirations in Japan for complete independence (from the US) in defence matters, China’s outreach and dominance amongst the countries in the African continent, the continued influence of the utopia of the Bolivian revolution in Latin America, and the swerving of the West Asian order. All of these indicate that in the post-cold war world, the US is a military and economic superpower that is rapidly declining. If we view the growing proximity between India and the US from this perspective, the bilateral relations can be termed as a partnership between a declining power and an aspiring one.

The US is trying to halt its decline by partnering with India, while the latter hopes to fulfil its aspirations through a partnership with the US. In the process, India must be careful at least on three counts. One, the intended conversion point for its relations and agreements with the US should not be the containment of China. It could be seen as Indian weakness vis-à-vis China by its neighbours, other aspiring Asian powers and most importantly by China itself. This would not bode well for the fulfilment of India’s aspirations. In this context, India should also be mindful of the US outreach with other South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka.  India is struggling to cope with the rising influence of one power in South Asia. It would be too much for India to handle the influences of two or more powers in the region.

Two, the strategic partnership with the US is a means and not an end. The overwhelming sentiments in favour of a strategic partnership with the US should not turn into a major goal in itself. India should be clear in terms of its ambitions and the role of its strategic partnership with the US in achieving them. While the Trump administration seems to be wholeheartedly siding with India on the Kashmir issue, New Delhi needs to secure its interests in Afghanistan through the US. India also needs to revisit its strategies for the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group that seems to have been deferred indefinitely due to India-China and Sino-US tensions. Without an NSG membership, reaching for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is futile.

Three, India must continue to assess how long the US can and should sustain the desire to be a leading power in Asia. The vacillating positions of the US administration during the Trump presidency have not solely been because of the whims of the US President. It is also the result of the groundswell of public opinion – or rather, disenchantment – regarding the necessity of US engagements in far-off regions. Exactly 100 years ago, public opinion overpowered the will of Woodrow Wilson to ensure that the US would not be a part of the newly founded dream organization, the League of Nations. If history repeats itself, it would be a great disadvantage to India. There is every reason for the US to be optimistic about bilateral relations with India, but there are many reasons for India to be cautious about a strategic partnership with the US.